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1. Introduction
Biometric technology is used to identify or verify a person’s
identity based on ones individual features. The unique fea-
tures can be divided into two categories: biological and
behavioral. Biological features are strictly connected with
the body, i.e., fingerprints, iris, or vain pattern. Behavioral
features are associated with a process of repeating some
actions what makes them individual, e.g. a signature.
Nowadays the most popular aim of using biometric devices
is to raise the security level in the public safety area. This
technology became popular also as an instrument to protect
against the unauthorized access to the restricted zones. The
biggest value of the biometric security measures is the fact
that the process of features comparison is automatic. In
consequence, it hinders the potential impostor to commit
an identity fraud.
This technology is also very convenient for users, as pass-
words or PIN codes are not required to get the authoriza-
tion, e.g., to withdraw money from the ATM machine. That
is why biometric technology becomes popular also in pri-
vate sectors of the economy, such as banking, labor, and
mass events.
Furthermore, Poland, as a member of the European Union
(EU), participates in biometrics’ projects aiming to raise
the level of safety on the territory of the European Com-
munity. These are: the Second Generation of Schengen
Information System, Visa Information System and Euro-
pean Dactyloscopy (Eurodac). Moreover, passports with
biometric photography and two encrypted fingerprints are
now being issued to the EU citizens. Therefore biomet-
ric technology became nowadays commonly used both in
documents and in the variety of security systems.
In spite of indubitable advantages, biometry arose a lot of
controversy especially in the area of privacy policy and data
protection. Opponents claim that collecting such sensible
data might be very risky as it could be used improperly. It
is always possible to modify a PIN code or a password but
is not possible to “change” a fingerprint or an iris.
According to the report “Biometric at the Frontiers: As-
sessing the Impact on Society” [1] it is possible to name
five areas in which the author of the text remark the poten-






This article will focus on the first two areas, which can
transpire to be crucial for the biometric system users. The
text is based on the research made by the author for the
Ph.D. purpose. The author analyzed legal acts, reports and
other documents concerning biometric technology both on
the EU level and on the domestic field. The research helped
to identify the general problems, which can occur while im-
plementing the biometric system. The results of the anal-
ysis may also be useful in a process of designing a legal
framework for a new biometric system.
2. Social Aspects
As it was pointed in the numerous texts the important is-
sue while implementing biometric technology is paying
attention to the level of social acceptance of the existing
system [1]–[3]. As the practice shows, several social issues
may be identified:
• the use of biometric technology to keep the citizens
under the police surveillance,
• the social fear of acquiring the biometric data,
• the misuse of the biometric technology,
• a fear of biometric fraud,
• ineffectiveness of biometric technology.
2.1. Biometric Technology in Person Surveillance
The biometric technology is claimed to be used to im-
prove the security. Therefore, generally it is associated
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with gathering and using biometric data by the police [4].
That causes questions about the appropriate use of the pro-
cessed data in the non-police systems. As a consequence
citizens are often concerned about their privacy rights. The
city of Łomża is a good example of the mentioned situa-
tion. The Mayor of Łomża decided to introduce biometric
fingerprints’ devices to improve contacts between the City
Hall and the citizen. As a result, the decision attracted a lot
of criticism. It was claimed that the biometric data are too
sensitive to gather them just to amend the efficiency of the
City Hall.
2.2. The Social Fear of Acquiring the Biometric Data
It is not unusual that the opposers of the new technology try
to discredit it in a spectacular way. Biometric technology
was no exception. In 2008, the hacker group Chaos Com-
puter Club acquired and published a fingerprint of German
Federal Minister of Interior Wolfgang Schauble [5]. The
group wanted to show how easy is to gather and improp-
erly use a biometric data. They acquired a fingerprint from
the glass after the Minister’s press conference. As a con-
sequence more and more people, not only in Germany, are
protesting against proceeding biometric data.
2.3. The Misuse of the Biometric Technology
Although there are often no limits in implementing biomet-
ric technology in a private sector, it has to be bear in mind
that irrelevant use of biometric data in one case may has an
influence on general social acceptance of biometric technol-
ogy. Facebook Deep Face software is an algorithm, which
finds and tags the same person on different photos [6].
It is claimed that the accuracy of Deep Face is 97.25%.
Notwithstanding Facebook introduced its application only
for amusement purposes, it is possible to use it to track
people’s interests and Internet activities. In consequence,
implementing such systems may cause social concerns and
have an influence on acceptance of the biometric technol-
ogy in other areas.
2.4. A Fear of Biometric Fraud
The social acceptance of biometrics technology is also
associated with the fear of the consequences of biomet-
ric identity fraud. In order to deceive a fingerprint device
a Chinese women Li Rong made a surgery to alter her
fingerprints [7]. As a result, she manage to enter Japan
illegally. Based on Li Rong case the opposers of biometric
technology clam that too much faith in put it the effective-
ness of biometric devices.
2.5. Ineffectiveness of Biometric Technology
Supporters of biometrics systems claim that the devices
are improving the level of safety because their accuracy
is very high. When, after such statement, it is reported
that the facial recognition system failed in identifying the
Boston marathon bombers, the citizens can lose confidence
in biometric technology as such [8]. A feeling of disap-
pointment is also intensifying by a lack of knowledge about
a factors influencing the proper functioning of the biometric
device.
3. Legal Aspects
It is important to understand that the legal and social aspects
concerning biometric technology are inextricably linked.
The social reluctance to biometric solutions can have va-
riety of basis. One of them might occur when ambiguous
legislation is being published. This can be a reason of con-
cerns about the privacy law and the proper protection of
biometric data. According to author’s research, it is possi-
ble to indicate six areas, which should be taken into account
while implementing biometric legislation:
• the aim of the regulation,
• the technical infrastructure,
• the gathering data rules,
• indicating the user’s group,
• indicating the excluded groups,
• emergency procedures,
• the protection of biometric data.
In the author’s opinion, similar problems can be identified
in the public sector as well as in the private one.
3.1. The Aim of the Regulation and the Technical
Infrastructure
The first and crucial issue before choosing a biometric so-
lution should refer to the proper identification of a sys-
tem’s aim. Two forms of using biometric authorization
can be named: identification and verification. During the
process of identification, the biometric sample is taken from
a person and compared with all the samples gathered in
a database.
Verification instead is a comparison between a biomet-
ric sample taken from a person and a sample from the
database, which is believed to come from the verified per-
son. Thus, identification is used for recognize once person-
ality whereas verification is a confirmation of the person-
ality declared.
Every legal act implementing a new biometric system
should indicate what is the aim of processing the biometrics
data. There are system in which both: identification and
verification are used, e.g. Visa Information System. The
importance to make a distinction between identification and
verification might be crucial mainly for the way of storing
the biometric samples. Verification does not require gath-
ering the biometric samples in a central database whereas
identification in most cases does. This means in practical
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terms that verification gives a person opportunity to store
a data by his own, e.g. on a card. The case of implement-
ing a EU’s biometric passports shows the seriousness of
this issue. The Council Regulation no. 2252/2004 on stan-
dards for security features and biometrics in passports and
travel documents issued by Member States [9] in Article 4
claims:
“[. . . ] 3. For the purpose of this Regulation, the biometric
features in passports and travel documents shall only be
used for verifying:
(a) The authenticity of the document.
(b) The identity of the holder by means of directly avail-
able comparable features when the passport or other travel
documents are required to be produced by law”.
Taking into account the aim of the regulation (verification)
the obvious consequence should have been storing finger-
prints in a new passport. Notwithstanding, within EU there
are countries in which the biometric data are processed in
a central database (e.g. France). Such differences do not
foster the acceptance of gathering biometric samples. Stor-
ing fingerprints in the central passports bases may be seen
as a misuse of the biometric samples.
3.2. The Gathering Data Rules
Another important issue while implementing biometric leg-
islation is to introduce a proper rules concerning gathering
the biometric data. A complete regulation must contain
not only a detailed instruction on the process of gathering
data but it should also indicate a person accountable for
the whole procedure. It is possible to find such a demand
in the Regulation no. 444/2009 of the European Parliament
and of the Council [10] amending council regulation no.
2252/2004 on standards for security features and biomet-
rics in passports and travel documents issued by member
states. Article 1a claims:
“1. The biometric identifiers shall be taken by qualified and
duly authorized staff of the national authorities responsible
for issuing passports and travel documents [. . . ]”.
Article 1a highlights the importance of taking the biomet-
ric identifiers by qualified employees as it is one of the
amendments to the regulation 2252/2004 (the amendments
were introduced after four years of biometric practice).
A second problem, mentioned above, is the existence of
internal instruction for the employees, who are going to
gather the data. In such cases the users will not know the
exact procedures a priori. European Union legislation con-
cerning gathering biometric data for the purpose of biomet-
ric systems or documents is terse in the indicated sphere.
Article 1a Regulation no. 444/2009 claims only:
“[. . . ] 2. Member States shall collect biometric identifiers
from the applicant in accordance with the safeguards laid
down in the Council of Europe’s Convention for the Pro-
tection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and
in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child. Member States shall ensure that appropriate pro-
cedures guaranteeing the dignity of the person concerned
are in place in the event of there being difficulties in en-
rolling [. . . ]”.
More precise information is available in technical specifi-
cations, e.g. Commission decision no. C (2006) 2909 and
in domestic regulations. For instance Polish passport leg-
islation is an example of a proper legislation in the area of
gathering a biometric data as it contains the whole process
step by step.
3.3. Indicating the User’s Group and Excluded Groups
The problem of proper users’ indication is directly liked
with a regulation’s aim. Nevertheless, it is necessary to
introduce a norm, which claims whose biometric data are
going to be gathered in a concrete system. It can be done
in a positive or negative manner. The difference lies in the
recording method. The first one requires indicating the tar-
get group literally. Article 4 of the Council Regulation no.
2725/2000 of 11 December 2000 concerning the establish-
ment of Eurodac for the comparison of fingerprints for the
effective application of the Dublin Convention [11] may be
an example:
“1. Each Member State shall promptly take the finger-
prints of all fingers of every applicant for asylum of at
least 14 years of age and shall promptly transmit the data
referred to in points (a) to (f) of Article 5(1) to the Central
Unit [. . . ]”.
The negative manner of recording indicates a general group
as a first step and afterwards a list of exceptions. Again, the
example may be passport regulation in Article 1, Regulation
no. 444/2009:
“2a. The following persons shall be exempt from the re-
quirement to give fingerprints: (a) Children under the age
of 12 years [. . . ]
(b) persons, where fingerprinting is physically impossi-
ble [. . . ]”.
Both recording manner are correct although the second one
often allow remarking more groups, which should be poten-
tially excluded from the process of biometric data storing.
It has to be underlined that, in the author’s opinion, all ex-
cluded groups should appear in the regulation, even if the
group seems to be obvious (as it is in the regulation above
in point b). It will give a future user the certainty of one’s
obligations.
3.4. Emergency Procedures
One of the crucial issues which has to be regulated are
emergency procedures. They are activated in two cases.
The first one is interrelated with the Failure to Enroll (FEE).
FEE is a biometric system error, which occur during the
process of taking a biometric identifier. In consequence,
it is impossible to create a sample which can be register
in a database. The reasons of occurring FEE may vary,
e.g., improper way of taking the sample or technologi-
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cal problem with the device. Regardless of the reason, the
most important is to introduce the norm of behaving when
the FEE will take place. The emergency procedure has
to be explicit and non-discriminative what means that in-
ability to register a person cannot be a reason for reject-
ing authorization, e.g., the inability to register fingerprints
of a citizen can not be the reason for rejecting him issue
a passport. Taking as example biometric passports, do-
mestic regulation should contain a norm, which claims that
when the FEE will occur the passport is being issued only
with traditional security measures.
The second situation when it is necessary to use the emer-
gency procedures occurs when there is no possibility to
verify user’s identity. In a case of fingerprints, the reason
may be temporally injured finger which exclude the ability
of comparing biometric samples. Such situation may be
resolved only by comparing other data instead biometric
identifiers.
The other issue may be the Failure Rejection Rate (FRR)
which occur when an authorized person is not allowed to
have an access to a system. In such cases, the question is if
a detailed control of other data is enough to give a person
potential privileges (e.g. a permission to cross the border)
and who should be responsible for making such a deci-
sion. Usually, the regulations are very general such as the
Article 4, Regulation no. 444/2009 in passport legislation:
“[. . . ] The failure of the matching in [biometric data – au-
thors note] itself shall not affect the validity of the passport
or travel document for the purpose of the crossing of ex-
ternal borders”.
The mentioned regulation is a consequence of the right
to dignity, which should be guaranteed for every EU citi-
zen. The lack of clear emergency procedures may in con-
sequence result a social anxiety when using biometric
systems.
3.5. The Protection of Biometric Data
One of the biggest concerns about using biometric system is
connected with the proper protection of gathered data. The
current legislation of the biometric data is not considering
them as a sensitive data such as for example information on
health, race and ethnic origins [12]. They are instead “or-
dinary” personal data, which of course have to be protected
but without restrictions attributed to sensitive information.
Nowadays we are on step to introduce the new European
legislation1 which, for the first time in the data protection
acts, gives a definition of biometric data and treats them
similar to the current sensitive data [13]. In consequences
the new regulation will strengthen security of gathering and
processing the biometric identifiers in general.
Apart from improving the general level of protecting the
biometric data, a legislation regulating a particular bio-
1However it has to be taken into account that the new EU regulation
classifies the data differently than the Directive 95/46/EC. There will be
no closed catalogue of sensitive data and the classification will be done
on the base of the analysis of the risk assessment.
metric system may contain also specific norms which are
linked with the aim of introducing the biometric security
measures. For instance, taking into account Polish pass-
port procedures [14], the Police officers are not allowed to
have an access to fingerprints samples (for the time they
are stored in a system before issuing a passport), whereas
they are permitted to ask for other data if needed to fulfill
their obligations. This norm is linked with the aim of the
regulation, which is verifying the individuals identity.
Therefore, it must be assumed that protecting biometric
data is not only connected with technical infrastructure of
processing the information but also with legal procedures
restricting the access to biometric samples.
4. Conclusion
The technological advancement has a huge influence on
ability of using more and more effective biometric sys-
tems. This encourages introducing biometric systems for
both security reason and users’ comfort. Despite the un-
doubted advantages of biometric technology, it has to be
always bear in mind that to create a well-functioning and
socially acceptable system it is necessary to launch the le-
gal frames relevant to the aim of the particular biometric
system. A proper system should be therefore an effect of
cooperation between engineers and lawyers with a back-
ground in privacy rights.
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